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Abstract 
 
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) has created a new dynamic for the oversight and 
implementation of elections, giving greater power to the states than previously.  We consider 
how HAVA has changed the relationship between states and localities, especially through the 
HAVA planning process.  We examine two approaches that states have used in HAVA 
planning—a rational approach and a pluralistic approach—and how these approaches can shape 
the power relationship between states and localities.  We then present two case studies from 
Georgia and California to illustrate how these two approaches have functioned in practice. 
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Since the 2000 presidential election debacle, many observers have expressed their 
amazement with the complicated nature of election administration in the United States.  There is 
no single set of election procedures and processes in the United States, nor are their 50 (one set 
per state).  Instead, there are thousands of different ways of running elections in the United 
States; before the 2000 election, local election officials, including both county and sub-county 
administrators, maintained their unique methods of election administration. 
Part of the reason for this decentralized model of election administration is constitutional, 
as Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution largely delegate election procedures for federal 
offices to the states.1  The federal government has periodically sought to provide some 
uniformity in election administration, for example, by pushing for more uniform protection of 
voting rights (the Voting Rights Act of 1965) or for more consistent voter registration procedures 
across the states (the National Voting Rights Act of 1993).  But before the 2000 presidential 
election, election administration procedures were largely a county or sub-county matter. 
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election, however, the decentralized nature of 
American election administration came under criticism.  Some of this concern arose after careful 
examination of the Florida election process in 2000 found substantial differences, across 
counties, in how administrative procedures were implemented; this is one way to view the 
Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore decision that stopped the Florida recount in December 2000.2  
Criticism deepened in other states, for example in California, where concern arose about the use 
of punch-card voting machines in counties with large minority-voter populations, when more 
reliable and accurate voting technologies were in use in counties with fewer minority voters.   
By 2002, the federal government acted, in the form of the Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA).  This legislation provided a marginally stronger federal role in election administration, 
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mainly by establishing a new federal entity, the Election Assistance Commission, and by 
mandating that states develop statewide voter registration databases and eliminate inferior voting 
technologies.  Although HAVA did not vastly expand the federal role in election administration, 
it did open the door for a stronger state role in election administration relative to the historical 
strength of local-government entities in conducting elections.  It is this potential transformation 
in the relative role of the state and local election officials that we examine here. 
In this article, we examine the recently published state HAVA plans to determine how 
state officials are using HAVA to reshape the dynamics of elections in the states. We are 
especially interested in evaluating the aspects of state HAVA plans where states are planning to 
exert control and where they are leaving matters in the control of local officials.  Examining 
three specific areas—voter registration, voting systems, and voter education—we are able to 
cluster states and evaluate the level of control they are asserting on the elections process.  After 
discussing the affect of HAVA generally on the states, we examine two approaches to HAVA 
implementation—a rational approach and a pluralistic approach—and how these approaches are 
being used in two states to show how HAVA has been used to affect changes in election 
administration.  The stories of how the secretaries of state in Georgia and California have 
attempted to use the 2000 election and the subsequent passage of HAVA as means of changing 
the balance of power between state and local officials are illustrative of how election processes 
and procedures are likely to change in the post-HAVA world.3 
THE ROAD TO HAVA 
 
The brunt of the criticisms about the conduct of the election in Florida fell on local election 
officials.  Local election officials in various jurisdictions used the butterfly ballot, deferred 
maintenance on punch-card machines, and implemented other procedures that made voting 
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difficult.4  Additionally, some election officials made extreme comments to the media after the 
election expressing a lack of concern about discrimination against certain classes of voters, 
comments that resulted in the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioning three Florida counties.5 
The post-election policy environment spawned an array of election-reform efforts.  
Almost all of the major national associations representing state and local election officials (e.g., 
the National Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association of County 
Recorders, Auditors, and Treasurers) and state and local governments (e.g., the National League 
of Cities and the National Conference of State Legislatures) created election-reform committees.  
There were also three major independent election-reform efforts:  the National Commission on 
Federal Election Reform (NCFER), the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP), and the 
Constitution Project’s Forum on Election Reform.  These independent groups initiated studies of 
election reform that combined public hearings and input from experts with independent research 
on various issues associated with elections.  Their reports noted that there would be benefits in 
shifting certain responsibilities from localities to the states, especially in the area of voter 
registration, and in creating uniform statewide standards in other areas.6   
 This movement to consolidate and reorganize certain aspects of the election process is a 
typical response in America to both real and perceived management and implementation 
problems in both the private and the public sectors.7  Hannah Sistare notes that there are four 
rationales for government reorganization:  (1) making government work better, (2) saving 
money, (3) enhancing power, and (4) addressing a pressing problem.8  Reorganizing the 
management of elections was clearly intended to address the first and fourth rationales.  
However, the election-reform proposals also had the potential to address the third rationale for 
government reorganization—enhancing or shifting power.  Governmental reorganizations are 
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often undertaken with the intent of enhancing executive or legislative power, or enhancing the 
control that one branch or the other has over a policy area, program, or agency.  Reorganization 
can also be undertaken to enhance the standing of certain groups within government, such as 
when Cabinet departments are created and these groups gain a seat at the Cabinet table with the 
president.  Reorganization can also be conducted to achieve the more focused goal of shifting 
decision making power within a given policy area from one entity to another.9   
In the case of election reform, the reorganization of elections was initiated by the federal 
government with congressional passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).  The final 
provisions in HAVA reflect the intersection of two political and policy dynamics.  First, there 
was a fundamental difference in views between the House—controlled by Republicans—and the 
Senate—controlled by Democrats—over the level of ongoing authority the federal government 
should have in election reform.  This conflict reflected obvious differences in ideology between 
the two branches of congress and differences in interpreting historical and legal norms.  The 
House was more sensitive to the historical norm that elections are primarily state activities 
carried out by local governments; the Senate relied on legal views that the federal government 
can establish rules and standards for all federal elections because they involve members of 
Congress.10 
Interest groups played an active role throughout the HAVA legislative process.  These 
groups included civil-rights and disability-rights organizations, state and local intergovernmental 
organizations, and corporations (e.g., voting machine vendors).  Outside actors, especially 
academics and prominent members of the various election reform commissions, also were 
involved in HAVA’s development.  The NCFER vigorously presented its recommendations to 
the congressional committees and met with various legislators during the drafting process to 
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provide technical assistance.  The Caltech/MIT VTP also provided technical assistance and 
input.  This effort of providing input often occurred in private meetings that included other 
interest groups, especially interests representing local election officials.11 
CHANGING STATE AND LOCAL CONTROL VIA HAVA 
 
In the end, the HAVA legislation created a modest role for the federal government.  HAVA 
empowered an Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to allocate funding to the states to 
purchase new voting equipment, as well as finance voter-registration and other election-related 
activities.  This design is quite typical of federal intergovernmental programs created to influence 
state or local activities and induce state and local officials to change specific behaviors.12  The 
EAC also is required to study various aspects of election administration and collect data from the 
states about their election activities.  
The EAC did not receive the power to create binding regulations on states regarding 
standards to be met in any given aspect of election administration.  Section 209 of HAVA 
explicitly states:  “The Commission shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate 
any regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit of 
local government.”  For example, the EAC cannot engage in rulemaking to create a single 
national standard for what constitutes a countable provisional ballot.  Instead, its major powers 
are holding hearings and disseminating information—especially related to best practices—that 
raise awareness of specific election-administration issues.   
The modest role for the federal government in HAVA means that the reform powers in 
HAVA were largely delegated to state election officials.  This decision is interesting in part 
because most states had played a relatively small role in election administration prior to 2000.  
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State laws typically make a state election official the final arbiter of election results and give the 
power to promulgate rules to that individual, but the responsibility for election management 
largely rests with local election officials.  Prior to HAVA, in most states, local governments 
decided which voting systems and voter registration system would be used in their community.  
HAVA provided states with the power to take control of these processes. 
The shift in the power dynamic between state and local governments in HAVA can be 
seen quite clearly in the process that was developed for states to complete prior to receiving 
federal funds under this law.  Section 254 is the centerpiece of the HAVA process; it outlines the 
requirements for a state plan to guide the HAVA implementation in a given state.  The first 12 of 
the 13 planning requirements explicitly discuss “how the state” will carry out a given activity.  
These include how the state will spend or distribute funds; provide programs such as voter 
education, poll-worker training, and election official training; and develop performance goals 
and measures to determine if HAVA’s goals are being achieved. 
Section 254 puts the state in a dominant position for implementing HAVA.  Section 255 
affects the control each state has over the planning process based on its power to determine the 
composition of its state planning committee.  Although the two largest election jurisdictions in a 
given state have to be included, the state is able to select all other members.  Local election 
officials have a voice in this discussion; given their expertise in actual election implementation, 
they are obvious candidates for inclusion in a state HAVA committee.  However, they are not 
agenda setters in the process.  The state election officials can easily stack the HAVA committee 
with their allies to achieve the outcome they desire.  The state officials are also in a position to 
control the drafting of the certification document, further increasing their control.  Equally as 
important for states, the scope of activities for which states can use HAVA funds is quite broad.  
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As long as the state controls the HAVA plan, it can determine if monies should be spent on 
voting technology, voter registration, voter education, programs for recruiting and training 
election officials and poll workers, improving the quantity and quality of available polling 
places, or assuring access for voters with physical disabilities, 
The ability of states to control the process vis-à-vis local election officials can be seen in 
the composition of the state planning committee membership listed in the HAVA reports.  On 
average only 26.85 percent of state HAVA committee members were local election officials.  On 
only three state committees—in Vermont, Georgia, and Pennsylvania—did the percentage of 
local election officials equal or exceed 50 percent.  At the other extreme, in four states—Rhode 
Island, West Virginia, Alaska, and California—local election officials accounted for less than 15 
percent of the membership of the state HAVA committee.  Table 1 categorizes states based on 
the percentage of local election officials on the state HAVA committee.  The distribution of local 
election official involvement is highest between 20 and 35 percent, a level where local officials 
have a say in the process but where the state is in a dominant position to control the outcome of 
the debate. 
(Table 1 here) 
HAVA ACTIVITIES AND STATE CONTROL 
 
Given the state’s control over the planning process, the plans can be viewed as reflecting the 
level of control that the state desires to exercise over elections.  States are in a position to take 
control over certain aspects of elections but can leave local governments in control over others.  
The variability in the level of control a state might want to assume over a given component of 
elections can be seen in the area of voter registration.  Section 303 of HAVA requires that  
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each State, acting through the chief State election official, shall 
implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, 
uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide 
voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the 
State level that contains the name and registration information of 
every legally registered voter in the State.  
Section 303 follows from both the NCFER and Caltech/MIT VTP reports, which recommended 
the development of statewide voter registration systems.  However, there are many ways to 
implement a statewide voter registration system.  One method—used by Michigan, for 
example—is to have the state play a large role in the operation and management of the system.  
By contrast, Utah is implementing a statewide voter registration system where the state is 
developing and will manage certain aspects of the system, but the local governments will 
maintain much of the registration control they had prior to HAVA. 
 A similar issue can be seen in the procurement of voting technologies that meet Section 
301 voting system standards, especially standards for voters with disabilities.  Some states have 
used HAVA as an impetus to engage in statewide voting system procurements, which put all 
local jurisdictions on the same voting platform.13  The advantage to this effort is that it allows the 
state to conduct uniform voter education campaigns regarding how to use the voting system; it 
also allows the state to purchase the equipment in a larger quantity, which can improve the price 
for the overall purchase.  However, many states have continued to allow local election officials 
to determine which Section 301 compliant equipment citizens will use. 
 Table 2 categorizes all states across three dimensions.  The first dimension is whether 
local election officials will play a strong role in the maintenance of the state voter registration 
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system.  Although HAVA requires the state to implement a statewide system, the role that local 
governments can or should play in this process is unstated.  The second dimension is whether the 
state is planning to adopt a uniform statewide voting system.  The third dimension is whether the 
state is planning to dominate the voter education process.  Voter education has both political and 
educational purposes, especially for the individual who sends out the information.   Control over 
this can be seen as both an issue of state versus local control as well as of political versus policy 
interests in voter education.  Many states are using election reform to control important aspects 
of elections, especially voter education and voting system choice.  This shift in control provides 
state election officials with greater influence over polling place activities because they can 
control both the information that voters get before they go to vote as well as the type of voting 
technology that is used by voters in the voting booth. 
(Table 2 here) 
APPROACHES TO HAVA PLANNING 
 
The decisions regarding the role of the state and local government stated in a HAVA plan reflect 
the outcome of certain decision processes.  There are several different approaches states could 
take in developing a HAVA plan.  Using case studies, we focus on two dimension of the 
planning process that come from different theoretical traditions.  The first dimension is the 
choice of decision making process to use, and here we contrast rational policy analysis with a 
political decision making process.14  The rational policy analysis process involves a careful 
process of defining the policy problem, collecting information, defining the proposed policy 
solution, and communicating that solution.  The second approach comes from pluralism and the 
political interest group process, where rational considerations play a diminished role in defining 
and achieving a specific policy outcome.15  Instead, political considerations are at the forefront of 
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the policy process, with interest group pressures and the political interests of the principals 
determining the solution selected.  Interest group elites typically dominate this process, and 
while corporate interests are often seen as being dominate elites in pluralist debates, the more 
defining attribute is that the interests of traditionally disenfranchised groups are discounted.  
These two dimensions are summarized in Figure 1. 
(Figure 1 here) 
Second, we examine the level of conflict that frames the environment in which decision 
making occurs.  Here, we contrast the high conflict environment in California with the 
consensual environment in Georgia.  In practice, the low conflict environment created the 
environment conducive to a participatory management process.   This allowed for effective 
citizen and interest group involvement in various aspects of the policy process, which can 
increase public support and acceptance for the selected policy choice.  By contrast, the high 
conflict environment in California was highlighted by litigation and a failure to negotiate among 
interests.16 
Thus, the two contrasting cases of Georgia and California fall into opposing categories in 
this typology.  California’s HAVA process became conflictual and political, while Georgia’s was 
consensual and rational.  Below, when we consider each of these cases in detail, we provide 
more analysis as to how we can categorize each case along each of these dimensions. 
 Of course, these are not the only approaches that states could adopt to implement their 
HAVA (and other) election reforms.  First, states could (and did) adopt approaches that were a 
mixture of pluralistic and rational; pluralistic approaches could be applied to some domains of 
reform (for example, state decisions about voting technology acquisitions in the wake of 
HAVA’s passage could be pluralistic, while their approach to the development of the statewide 
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voter list could be more rationalistic).  Second, some states appear to be implementing HAVA in 
a “muddling through” approach, where they are only tackling HAVA reforms incrementally and 
in what appear to be minimal ways.17  Here we focus on the pluralistic and rational approaches as 
they are quite different approaches to implementation of a reform package like HAVA. 
 In the case studies that follow, the approach chosen largely reflects the political choice of 
the state’s elections official.  HAVA created a wide opening in the policy window that provided 
these state officials with a broad choice of approaches to follow.  The following case studies 
illustrate two of these approaches.  In Georgia, a rational and participatory approach was used to 
determine how to reform elections.  The state involved primarily election officials, but also 
includes voters and groups interested in reforming elections.  By contrast, in California, a more 
pluralistic approach was been used, with substantial involvement of many stakeholders 
throughout the state, but where the role of local election officials was much less significant than 
in Georgia, and where the secretary of state’s office attempted to use HAVA to centralize some 
power (voter education initiatives and possibly the statewide voter registration database).   
However, the very pluralism used in the early stages of the HAVA implementation process in 
California ended up producing a highly confrontational situation between interest groups, local 
election officials, interest groups representing the traditionally disenfranchised (especially 
individuals with disabilities and language minorities) and the secretary of state’s office.  These 
choices reflect very different political and policy making choices made by each secretary of state 
to achieving their specific goals related to election reform, and they possibly reflect the influence 
of other variables, like the existing relationships between state and local election officials, the 
political and partisan context of each state, and concerns in the state about possible litigation and 
federal scrutiny of their electoral process. 
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THE RATIONAL PROCESS APPROACH—HAVA IN GEORGIA 
 
Although the focus of the nation was on Florida after the 2000 election, the first legal action 
related to election administration occurred in Georgia in the case Andrews v. Cox.18  The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) summed up the electoral problems in Georgia in a press 
release that accompanied its lawsuit: 
voters in some Georgia counties were ten times more likely than 
others to lose their right to vote because of a "fatally flawed" 
system that disproportionately affects people of color…the state's 
voting system [is] “a hodgepodge consisting of antiquated devices, 
confusing mechanisms, and equipment having significant error 
rates even when properly used.”   The state's failure to accurately 
record votes deprives its citizens of equal protection and due 
process as guaranteed under state law and by the United States 
Constitution, and violates the federal Voting Rights Act.19 
Although this legal action could be seen as providing an impetus for subsequent state action, in 
fact the state was already acting.  The claims made by the ACLU were not disputed by Georgia’s 
secretary of state, Cathy Cox, a Democrat, because her office was the source of the underlying 
data.  Cox saw the 2000 election debacle as an opening for her to improve election 
administration in the state and to secure resources for this purpose.  In John Kingdon’s language, 
Cox took advantage of the policy window opening and acted as a policy entrepreneur to get the 
result she desired.20  This effort started with a comprehensive analysis of the problems that had 
occurred in the election, and then the creation of a proposed solution to the problem. 
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 The problems in 2000 in Georgia were outlined in report entitled The 2000 Election, A 
Wake-Up Call for Reform and Change.21  The report focused on problems associated with the 
antiquated voting systems used in the state.  Two critical problems identified were large 
variations in over-vote and under-vote rates across voting systems, and variation in these rates 
across demographic groups—especially white and African-American voters—within given 
platforms.  This report and subsequent studies found that African-American voters were 
statistically less likely to have their votes counted on paper-based voting systems—punch cards 
and optical scanned ballots—compared to white voters.22 
Cox proposed addressing this problem through a clearly delineated, structured, and 
inclusive reform process.  Specifically, she drafted and had legislation introduced into the 
Georgia General Assembly that would promote election reform by having the state purchase a 
uniform electronic voting system to be implemented across the state.  The legislation did not 
empower the secretary of state to select the equipment but instead created the 21st Century 
Voting Commission to conduct a pilot test of various voting technologies to determine which one 
best suited the needs of Georgians.  The commission had 18 members, and Cox used all eight of 
her appointments to select local election officials, bringing important expertise and credibility 
among the other 151 county election officials to the process.  The commission then held hearings 
to allow for greater civic involvement and to educate the public about the state’s election reform 
efforts.  The commission then pilot tested various voting systems in local elections in the fall of 
2001, and conducted exit polling as a part of this effort to determine public support for each 
voting system.  This effort was augmented by survey data collected by the University of 
Georgia’s Carl Vincent Institute of Government regarding statewide attitudes about the move to 
electronic voting.  The decision by the state to move to a single electronic voting technology 
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statewide reflects the outcome, therefore, of a process that identified a problem, examined 
various alternatives for addressing the problem, tested specific alternatives, and allowed for 
public input into the process. 
The work of Georgia’s 21st Century Voting Commission presaged in many ways the 
work many states did in their HAVA planning—Georgia’s HAVA committee membership and 
HAVA plan largely reflects this previous work—and illustrates a rational approach to planning 
and analysis.  The rationalist approach begins with information gathering.23  This feeds into both 
problem analysis—developing an understanding of the problem—and solution analysis—
determining what solution might best address the problem.  Georgia engaged in two sets of 
information gathering, starting with its initial evaluation and report on the problems in the 2000 
election and again with the conduct of its pilot testing.  This rational process had two dividends 
for the secretary of state.  First, it allowed her to develop buy in and support at the state level, 
especially with the governor and legislature.  This was critical to the success of her efforts 
because it gave her access to the resources she needed to make the voting system transition a 
success.  For example, in Georgia’s 2003 budget, the secretary of state received 13 positions and 
$3.4 million to conduct voter education and other activities related to the transition to electronic 
voting.  These resources made garnering support among local election officials much easier 
because the state could exchange money, resources, and training to localities for greater state 
control over elections, including determining the voting system to be used. 
HAVA was passed just as Georgia was holding its 2002 elections, the first using 
electronic voting statewide.  The analyses that were done immediately after the election found 
that the reform had been a success.  The statewide residual vote rate went from 4.8 percent 
statewide for the top-ticket race under the panoply of voting systems used in 1988 to 0.88 
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percent in 2002.24  When comparing residual vote rates in 2002 to the residual vote rates for the 
1998 gubernatorial and 1996 Senate races, it was determined that approximately 77,000 more 
ballots were counted using electronic voting than would have been counted under the previous 
system.  More recent analyses have shown that the greatest reductions in residual votes occurred 
among low-income and African-American voters, both of which have been historically 
disenfranchised in the state.25  These outcome data reflect the achievement of the rational policy 
goals that were established at the outset of this process. 
In HAVA, Georgia was able to build on the process used by the 21st Century Voting 
Commission.  Many of the same participants were involved in both commissions, and Cox saw 
to it that the HAVA commission had a strong representation by local election officials.  In fact, 
Georgia had the highest rate of local election official involvement in HAVA, along with 
Pennsylvania, with 60 percent of the HAVA planning members in the state being local election 
officials.  The state again used a participatory approach for developing the HAVA plan, and was 
able to leverage the success of the previous reforms to promote activities such as uniform 
statewide poll-worker and election-official training and voter education.  This effort was made 
easier by the state having a uniform statewide voting system. 
THE PLURALISTIC APPROACH—HAVA IN CALIFORNIA 
 
Although there is a stark contrast in their responses to the 2000 election, in many ways the 
starting point for reform in both states was similar.  California, like Georgia, was sued after the 
2000 election for using punch cards.   In California, the outcome of the Common Cause v. Jones 
lawsuit was a consent decree that banned the use of punch-card voting systems as of March 
2004.26  Unlike the situation in Georgia, where Secretary of State Cox was able to avoid messy 
litigation after the 2000 election, this court case in California was divisive and helped to frame 
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the discussion over election reform in conflictual, not consensual, terms.  Also, in March 2002, 
California voters approved Proposition 42, the “Voting Modernization Act”, which allocated 
$200 million in state funds to replace old voting systems.  Proposition 41, while allowing for a 
strong state role in the acquisition of new voting technologies by California counties, established 
a Voting Modernization Board to administer these funds, with three board members appointed by 
the governor and two appointed by the secretary of state.  Proposition 41 passed in March 2002, 
the same election where candidate Kevin Shelley was chosen as the Democratic candidate for 
Secretary of State, a race he would win in the fall, thereby replacing term-limited Republican 
Bill Jones. 
Here we encounter two very important places where California differs from Georgia, 
differences that we argue have led to two very distinct HAVA implementation paths.  First, 
California’s election administration environment is vastly more heterogeneous than Georgia’s, 
with California counties representing a broader spectrum of administrative problems and 
practices after 2000 compared to Georgia counties.  Consider the simple demographics of the 
two states:  Georgia’s largest county, Fulton County, has 440,291 registered voters in the most 
recent (2005) enumeration; California’s largest county, Los Angeles County, as 4,075,352 
registered voters in the most recent (2005) enumeration, more voters than exist in the entire state 
of Georgia.27  While ten California counties have more registered voters than Fulton County, 
Georgia, California also has some very small election jurisdictions, including Alpine County 
(831 registered voters) and Sierra County (2,307 registered voters).   
Not only is there a broader size range of election jurisdictions in California compared to 
Georgia, California is also more ethnically diverse.  Although 28.7 percent of Georgia’s 
population is African-American, California has a smaller White population than Georgia and has 
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a number of language minorities.  For example, Los Angeles County must provide election 
materials in six languages as well as English.  This diversity in California sets the stage for a 
potentially more conflictual HAVA process, as a wider diversity of administrative practices and 
problems needed to be reflected in the development of the HAVA State Plan. 
The second major distinction between California and Georgia lay in state politics and 
process.  California’s term limit law covers the secretary of state’s office; individuals are allowed 
to only hold the office for two-terms.  As we noted above, Bill Jones, a conservative Republican 
who had been secretary of state since 1994, was term-limited in 2002 and was planning a run for 
higher office just as the post-2000 election debate, and HAVA development, began.  A major 
upheaval in the secretary of state’s office occurred in 2002, when the liberal Democrat Shelley 
took over this office.  Shelley, widely seen in California as a Democratic star in the making, 
came into statewide office looking to make his mark to support a likely run for another statewide 
office, possibly Governor in 2006, just as HAVA implementation began.  As we note below, 
Shelley’s political ambitions led to a much more political HAVA development and 
implementation process than seen in Georgia.  Cathy Cox had only recently taken office—
winning her seat in 1998—and operated in a more conservative political environment, both 
ideologically and in regards to decisions to run for higher office.  Statewide officials in Georgia 
often do not run for other positions, or wait very long periods before running for another office.    
Like most states, California created a “State Plan Advisory Committee” after the passage 
of HAVA.  The Committee held five public hearings and released a draft a preliminary plan in 
June 2003.  However, California’s HAVA planning was much different than Georgia on several 
levels.  First, Georgia acted much quicker than California, enacting much of its reform efforts 
before HAVA was even enacted.  Second, California’s planning process was much more 
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pluralistic and political, something that began with the decision to appoint a wide range of 
interest groups onto the Committee and appoint very few election officials.  In fact California has 
the smallest number of local election officials on its HAVA planning committee of any state.  
Finally, as became very problematic later, the Secretary of State used HAVA to achieve his own 
political goals at the expense of the state’s interests. 
During the implementation of HAVA in 2003 and 2004, two different storms would blow 
into California’s election-reform efforts.  One of these storms was the gubernatorial recall 
election, which began building in the spring of 2003, and which erupted into a chaotic, 
controversial, and expensive election held on 7 October 2003.  Before this election could be held, 
the Democratic secretary of state’s office made many controversial decisions about the process 
and procedures under which this novel recall election could be held, and many of these decisions 
(and decisions by local election officials) were contested in a series of lawsuits in the summer 
and fall of 2003.28  The logistics of the recall election, the litigation it spawned, and the growing 
controversy over what some saw as partisan election administration in California effectively 
stopped election reform well into the late fall of 2003.   
The second storm, still raging today, is the debate over electronic voting machines.  
Partly because some of the strong advocates for the use of the so-called “voter verified paper 
audit trail” (VVPAT) are located in California, and partly due to the fact that it was clear that 
some California counties were poised in 2002 and 2003 to transition to electronic voting 
machines for precinct voting, the fight erupted in 2002 and 2003 in California—both in 
Sacramento and in a number of counties—over electronic voting systems.  Secretary of State 
Kevin Shelley, sensing the building controversy, took a number of steps to try to resolve the 
debate. By 2004, he had decertified the electronic voting machines of one manufacturer and had 
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issued a whole slate of short- and long-term regulations for the use of electronic voting machines 
produced by other manufacturers.  In response, several counties and disability-rights groups sued 
the secretary of state to have electronic voting equipment allowed in the 2004 election, which 
resulted in lengthy negotiations between the state and localities in order to arrive at a 
resolution.29  At the same time, the state and four counties were being sued by disability rights 
advocates because they did not provide access to accessible voting technologies, such as 
electronic voting machines.  This controversy consumed considerable time and resources and 
kept the HAVA reform process from moving forward quickly. 
However, the pluralistic, and possibly partisan, evolution of the HAVA reforms in 
California slowed down at the end of 2004 as allegations arose that HAVA voter-education funds 
(allocated to statewide voter-education efforts due to the formula developed in the state’s HAVA 
implementation plan) may have been used for partisan or political purposes by the secretary of 
state’s Office.  A review of the use of HAVA voter-education funds by Shelley’s office was 
conducted by the state auditor, who found a number of questionable grants and questionable 
partisan activities conducted by contractors using federal HAVA funds.30  This audit provided 
additional evidence that the HAVA effort in California was not focused on developing a 
uniform, statewide voting process; rather, the HAVA effort was being used by state election 
officials in a pluralistic and possibly political manner.  This controversy led to the decision by 
Kevin Shelley to resign on March 1, 2005.   
Additionally, California’s development of a statewide voter registration database is 
progressing slowly.  Again, the difficulties in California with this component of their HAVA 
reforms are partly exogenous, affected by the delays imposed by the recall election, but are also 
partly endogenous.  Specifically, delays in HAVA planning occurred because of the secretary of 
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state’s heavy involvement of resources and energy in the national VVPAT debate and the 
allegations regarding improper use of HAVA funds.  The substance of this debate centers on 
whether the current CalVoter voter registration system—which has been used since 2000 in all 
California counties and was developed under Shelley’s predecessor Bill Jones—is HAVA 
compliant and can serve the voter registration needs of the state.  The secretary of state supports 
developing a new system at a cost of $40 million to $60 million.   
The local registrars, led by Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters Conny McCormack, 
support modifying the existing system and have referred to Shelley’s desire to build a new 
system as “folly.”31  McCormack, whose own county constitutes 25 percent of the registered 
voters in California, argues that CalVoter is either HAVA compliant or close to being so.  As she 
told the Los Angeles Times, “Why not simply upgrade CalVoter to meet HAVA compliance, 
rather than attempt to procure and implement a new [system]?”32  The state audit of HAVA 
singled out the failure of the secretary of state to address this procurement in a timely manner 
and noted that the state risked an enforcement action by the U.S. Department of Justice if it fails 
to develop this system before 1 January 2006.  While the exact approach that California will 
follow for the statewide database is currently unclear, what is clear is that the struggle over 
whether the system will be state-centric or locally autonomous is far from being decided. 
The debate over CalVoter highlights the confrontational relationship that has been the 
trademark of California’s HAVA process and the environment in which it has been implemented.  
Members of the HAVA planning committee have literally been suing each other over various 
aspects of HAVA implementation, and there is no clear set of goals for everyone to move 
toward.  In fact, it often seems that much of the debate over election reform in California has 
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occurred in the media and in the courts, as the various interest groups jockey to achieve their 
own goals. 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
HAVA has created a mechanism that states can use to shift the balance of control over elections 
from local officials to states through the HAVA planning process.  States vary widely in the level 
of participation they allow local election officials in the HAVA planning process.  Some states, 
like Georgia, provide local election officials with a large say in how the state moves forward 
with HAVA.  In Georgia, the state was able to build on a previously established relationship 
between the secretary of state and local government officials.  In California, the state has pursued 
a much more pluralistic approach and attempted to involve a broad array of interest groups in the 
HAVA planning process, with local election officials playing a much more modest role.   
We also illustrated how state HAVA plans can vary in the level of control they are 
actually moving into state hands.  Not surprisingly, states have made efforts to keep voter 
education—and the concomitant publicity it provides state officials—under their domain.  The 
movement of voter registration and voting equipment procurement to the state level, however, is 
a much more fundamental change in the previous dynamic of local control over elections.  These 
systems often shape the way work is conducted locally, and because elections are still 
implemented locally, the state having control over system procurement can change election 
management locally. 
 The Georgia and California cases also illustrate differences in approaches for identifying 
and addressing key issues within the state relative to election reform.  In Georgia, there was a 
rational approach used for addressing election-related problems, with the state conducting a 
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rigorous analysis of problems that existed with voting technologies.  State officials then 
addressed these problems through the procurement of new voting technologies, and were able to 
conduct policy evaluations to show the efficacy of this effort.  By contrast, in California, the 
state has engaged in several studies related to voting equipment, but the studies have focused 
largely on the issue of voter-verified paper trails (VVPT), in part because the leading advocates 
of VVPT are in California.  Other issues—such as improving the enfranchisement of language 
minorities, the disabled, and the reduction of the residual-vote rate—have not been the focus of 
evaluation or action by the state.  Instead, a pluralistic, and somewhat political, approach has 
been used for HAVA implementation.  The process has been conflictual, with the result being 
several lawsuits, a harsh state audit of the spending of HAVA funds, and a delay in the 
implementation of HAVA. 
 Other states have also followed more rational or pluralistic approaches in the 
development of state HAVA plans.  As these plans are implemented, it will be possible to 
determine which approach resulted in more effective election reform for voters.  Likewise, it will 
be possible to examine how power has shifted between states and localities, and whether states 
are up to the challenges that HAVA has placed at their doorstep.  The development of new 
technologies and new demands by voters for reforms—such as early voting, no-excuse voting by 
mail, and Internet voting for overseas citizens and military personnel—has the potential to 
further this shift in control of elections between states and localities.  A key question is whether 
these changes will benefit voters, the ultimate customer of election services. 
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Table 2 
State Versus Local Control of Various Election Reform Components 
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Figure 1:  Dimensions to HAVA Approaches 
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